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Abstract. We study multidimensional mechanism design in a common
scenario where players have private information about their willingness
to pay and their ability to pay. We provide a complete characterization of
dominant-strategy incentive-compatible direct mechanisms where over-
reporting the budget is not possible. In several settings, reporting larger
budgets can be made suboptimal with a small randomized modification
to the payments.
We then derive a closely related partial characterization for the general
case where players can arbitrarily misreport their private budgets. Im-
mediate applications of these results include simple characterizations for
mechanisms with publicly-known budgets and for mechanisms without
monetary transfers.
The celebrated revenue equivalence theorem states that the seller’s rev-
enue for a broad class of standard auction formats and settings will be
the same in equilibrium. Our main application is a revenue equivalence
theorem for financially constrained bidders.
1 Introduction
Budget constraints are central to big business auctions. Cramton(1995) states
that it realistic to assume that all firms participating in the historic PCS telecom-
munications spectrum license auction, held on July 1994 by the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (FCC), were faced with budget constraints. In Google’s
GSP keyword auction and other search engine advertising platforms, the bidders
are required to specify their bids as well as their budget limits (Edelman et al.(2007),Varian(2007)
and Aggarwal et al.(2009)).
Classical results in mechanism design literature do not necessarily carry
over to common scenarios with budget constraints. Ausubel and Milgrom(2002)
showed that the dominant-strategy of the VCG auction breaks down when bid-
ders have limited budgets.1 Che and Gale(1998) showed a revenue dominance of
the standard first-price auction over second-price auction in the presence of bud-
get constraints. On the positive side, several incentive-compatible auctions do
carry over. The classical multiple object ascending auction for unit-demand bid-
ders due to DGS generalizes so as to accommodate incentive-compatible auctions
for financially constrained bidders (Hatfield and Milgrom(2005) and Aggarwal et al.(2009)).
1 See also Borgs et al.(2005), Lavi and May(2012) and references therein.
Recently, Dobzinski et al.(2012) showed that the clinching auction due to Ausubel(2004)
generalizes if bidders have publicly known budgets. Bhattacharya et al.(2010)
further showed that for an infinitely divisible good, a bidder cannot improve
her/his utility by reporting a budget smaller than the actual one. They also
observed that reporting larger budgets can be made suboptimal with a small
randomized modification to the payments.
This paper studies dominant-strategy incentive-compatible deterministic mech-
anisms in a model with multidimensional types, private values and private bud-
gets with hard constraints (that is, no player can pay more than her actual
budget). We shall consider direct revelation mechanisms, which consist of a so-
cial choice function and a payment function. A social choice function aggregates
player reports of their private values as well as their budgets to select one out-
come. We say that a social choice function is implementable if there exists a pay-
ment function that makes truthful revelation incentive-compatible. The property
of a social choice function to be implementable by a unique payment function
(up to an additive constant) is called revenue equivalence.
In classical mechanism design literature, implementability is intimately con-
nected to monotonicity. In single-item auctions, monotonicity requires that player
who reports a higher value must have a greater probability of receiving the
item. In general, monotonicity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
implementability of social choice functions. For single dimensional types (such
as single-item auctions) Myerson(1981) showed that monotonicity is also suffi-
cient for any social choice function to be implementable. However, for multiple-
item auctions (where players have a loosely correlated values for a distinct
subset of items) this is no longer the case. For such multidimensional envi-
ronments, Rochet(1987) showed that a condition called cyclic-monotonicity is
necessary and sufficient for implementability. Combinatorially, this condition es-
sentially says that a multidimensional social choice function is implementable if
and only if a corresponding graph contains no negative cycle.
Remarkably, monotonicity is also analogous to the celebrated revenue equiva-
lence principle for single-item auctions (Myerson(1981)). However, in general this
need not be the case, since revenue equivalence in multidimensional domains is
not implied by cyclic-monotonicity. A recent result by Heydenreich et al.(2009)
characterizes revenue equivalence in multidimensional domains. The paper shows
that revenue equivalence holds if and only if all distances in the above corre-
sponding graph are anti-symmetric. Intuitively, a strengthening of the cyclic-
monotonicity condition characterizes revenue equivalence.
While cyclic-monotonicity is a more complex condition than monotonic-
ity, several studies have characterized multidimensional environments for which
monotonicity implies cyclic-monotonicity. In a variety of multidimensional do-
mains, monotonicity (or other related simple local properties) is essentially suffi-
cient for any social choice function to be implementable (Jehiel and Moldovanu(2001),Bikhchandani et al.(2006),Saks and Yu(2005),
Ashlagi et al.(2010),Vohra(2011),Carroll(2012), Archer and Kleinberg(2013), and
references therein).2
In this paper we find that Rochet’s cyclic-monotonicity condition extends
to multidimensional environments with private budgets. We show how to cir-
cumvent the assumption that players always have the ability to pay up to their
respective values, while obtaining a characterization result and a corresponding
graph in the same spirit as Rochet. Our second contribution is a generaliza-
tion of the revenue equivalence characterization by Heydenreich et al.(2009) to
multidimensional environments with private budgets.
1.1 Organization of this paper
In Section 2 we derive a simple characterization for multidimensional dominant-
strategy incentive-compatible mechanism design without money. Section 3 stud-
ies multidimensional dominant-strategy incentive-compatible mechanism design
with private budgets. We start with a necessary condition for incentive-compatible
private budget settings. We next show the sufficiency of this condition if over-
reporting the budget is impossible. We then consider a strengthening of this
condition and show its sufficiency for the general case (where players can report
any budget).
Section 4 shows a revenue equivalence principle for private budget settings
(where players can report any budget) satisfying certain reasonable conditions.
Section 5 illustrates the results through examples. All absent proofs can be found
in the Appendix.
2 Warm-up: Characterizing Mechanism Design without
Money
In this section we consider a multidimensional setting with private values where
monetary transfers are infeasible. We show a simple characterization for players
with cardinal preferences.
2.1 The Model
We consider a setting with n players and a finite set A of possible outcomes.
Player ℓ’s private valuation is determined by vℓ ∈ Vℓ ⊆ IR
|A|, where vℓ(a) is
player ℓ′s value for outcome a ∈ A, and Vℓ is the space of all possible valuations
of player ℓ. Let V = V1 × · · · × Vn denote the total valuation space. We consider
a multidimensional setting with private values (where vℓ(a) can be nonnegative
or negative) and publicly known zero budgets.
A mechanism design without money f consists of a social choice function
f : V × 0 → A and a zero payment scheme p : V → 0, where 0 ∈ IRn. In a
2 Lavi and Swamy(2009) used cyclic-monotonicity directly to design an incentive-
compatible mechanism in a multidimensional scheduling setting.
direct revelation mechanism without money, the social choice function chooses
for a vector v ∈ V of aggregate reports of all players an outcome f(v,0), whereas
the payment scheme assigns a zero payment to each player. A mechanism design
without money can be regarded as a mechanism for players with publicly-known
zero budgets, where monetary transfers are not feasible. Let (vℓ, v−ℓ) denote the
aggregate report vector when player ℓ reports vℓ and the other players’ reports
are represented by v−ℓ.
Definition 1. A direct revelation mechanism without money f : V × 0→ A is
called dominant-strategy implementable if for every player ℓ, every vℓ, v
′
ℓ ∈ Vℓ
and v−ℓ ∈ V−ℓ, the following condition holds:
vℓ(f(v, 0)) ≥ vℓ(f(v
′, 0)),
where v = (vℓ, v−ℓ) and v
′ = (v′ℓ, v−ℓ).
Remark 1. When clear from context we will sometimes use the term imple-
mentability to denote dominant-strategy implementability.
2.2 Presentation Assumptions
Throughout the paper we without loss of generality restrict our attention to a
model with a single agent (say, player ℓ) and assume reported valuations v−ℓ
and budgets of all other players B−ℓ to be fixed. This is without loss of gener-
ality as all relevant definitions can be interpreted by holding all other players’
reports fixed. For simplicity of notation when clear from context we suppress the
subscript ℓ and write V , v and B instead of Vℓ, vℓ, and Bℓ. For convenience, we
also assume that f is onto (since otherwise A can be condensed to be the range
of f).
2.3 The Characterization
For two outcomes a and a′ let
δ(a, a′) = inf {v(a)− v(a′) | v ∈ V such that f(v,0) = a}. (1)
Informally, δ(a, a′) represents the least gain achieved by deviation from a
to a′, when a is chosen by truthful reporting and a′ is chosen by misreporting
(while keeping the valuation of other players fixed). Since f is onto, δ(a, a′) <∞.
We can now state our simple characterization for implementable mechanisms
without money.
Proposition 1. A mechanism without money f : V × 0 → A is dominant-
strategy implementable if and only if δ(a, a′) ≥ 0 for every a, a′ ∈ A.
Proof. Assume f is implementable without money. For any pair of valuations
v, v′ ∈ V such that f(v,0) = a and f(v′,0) = a′, we have v(a) ≥ v(a′) by the
implementability without money of f . The definition of δ then gives v(a)−v(a′) ≥
δ(a, a′) ≥ 0.
Conversely, if f is not implementable without money, there exist v, v′ ∈ V
such that v(a) < v(a′), where f(v,0) = a and f(v′,0) = a′. Then, δ(a, a′) ≤
v(a)− v(a′) < 0. ⊓⊔
3 Characterizing Mechanism Design with Private
Budgets
In this section we study dominant-strategy incentive-compatible mechanisms in
a multidimensional setting where players have private valuations and private
budgets.
We continue with the private value setting introduced previously using the
following modifications. Player ℓ has private valuation vℓ ∈ Vℓ ⊆ IR
|A|
+ , where
vℓ(a) is player ℓ
′s nonnegative value for outcome a ∈ A. In addition, player ℓ has
private budget Bℓ ≥ 0. Let Bℓ ⊆ IR+∪∞ denote the space of all possible budget
limits of player ℓ. Notice that if the budget of player ℓ is public knowledge then
the set Bℓ is a singleton.
Players are assumed to be utility maximizers but can never pay beyond their
budgets. Specifically, player ℓ’s utility with private budget Bℓ, derived for paying
x ≥ 0 for outcome a, is vℓ(a) − x as long as x ≤ Bℓ and is negative infinity if
x > Bℓ. Note that we consider here a multidimensional setting with nonnegative
private values and private budget constraints.
A mechanism (f, p) with private budgets consists of a social-choice function
f : V×B → A and a payment function p : V×B → IRn, where V = V1×· · ·×Vn,
B = B1 × · · · × Bn and the ℓ
th component of p is the payment requirement of
player ℓ. We restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms where each player
reports its private valuation vℓ ∈ Vℓ, as well as its private budget Bℓ ∈ Bℓ. Let
v−ℓ, B−ℓ denote the reported valuations and budgets of players other than ℓ.
Definition 2. A direct revelation mechanism (f, p) with private budgets is
called dominant-strategy implementable (or implementable, for short) if the fol-
lowing conditions hold:
1. (IC) Incentive Compatibility: For every player ℓ = 1, . . . , n, every v × B ∈
V × B, and every v′ℓ × B
′
ℓ ∈ Vℓ × Bℓ if we denote a = f(v,B) and a
′ =
f((v′ℓ, v−ℓ), (B
′
ℓ, B−ℓ)), then
vℓ(a)− pℓ(v,B) ≥ vℓ(a
′) − pℓ((v
′
ℓ, v−ℓ), (B
′
ℓ, B−ℓ)),
for every pℓ((v
′
ℓ, v−ℓ), (B
′
ℓ, B−ℓ)) ≤ Bℓ.
i.e., no player can improve its utility by misreporting its true private val-
uation and/or true private budget in order to obtain some other outcome
whose payment is below Bℓ. If the budget is public knowledge then players
can only report their true budgets. If budget over-reporting is not allowed,
then B′ℓ ≤ Bℓ.
2. (IR) Individual Rationality: The mechanism never requires a player to pay
more than its reported value.
3. (BF) Budget Feasibility: The mechanism never requires a player to pay more
than its reported budget.
4. (NPT) No Positive Transfer: The mechanism never subsidizes any player
with a monetary amount.
Definition 3. A social choice function f with private budgets is called imple-
mentable if there exists a payment function p such that the mechanism (f, p) is
dominant-strategy implementable.
Graph Theoretic Definitions. To state our main results we use some basic def-
initions from Graph Theory. Recall that a (directed) graph is a pair G(M,E),
where M is a finite set and E ⊆ M ×M . An element n ∈ M is called a node
and an element e = (n, n′) ∈ E is called an arc. A complete directed graph is a
graph in which E =M ×M .
A (finite) path from node n1 to node nk inG is a sequence P = (n1, n2, . . . , nk)
in E such that ei = (ni,mi) ∈ E and ni+1 = mi, where i = 1, . . . , k − 1.
We denote by e ∈ P that e is an arc in P . A (finite) cycle in G is a path
C = (e1, e2, . . . , ek) such that mk = n1. When clear from the context, the cy-
cle C may be written as (n1, n2, . . . , nk). To each arc e ∈ E we assign a length
l(e) ∈ IR. The length of a path P is l(P ) = Σe∈P l(e). A path P is called negative
if l(P ) < 0. We denote by ∆(ni, nk) the length of the shortest path from node
ni to node nk in G.
A strongly connected component of a directed graph G = (M,E) is a maximal
set of vertices K ⊆ M such that for every pair of nodes ni and nj in K, there
is a path from ni to nj , and a path from nj to ni. A directed acyclic graph is a
directed graph with no cycles.
3.1 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Private Budgets
Our main result in this section is a necessary and sufficient conditions for the
multidimensional private budget setting. Theorem 1 provides a necessary con-
dition for implementability. Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 show the sufficiency of
the condition in Theorem 1 in several settings. The proof technique is construc-
tive; namely, a concrete payment function is specified to show the sufficiency.
Examples 1 and 2 in Section 5 further demonstrate our conditions.
For a ∈ A, we define
β(a) = inf {B | f(v,B) = a for some v ∈ V}, (2)
ω(a) = inf {v(a) | f(v,B) = a for some B ∈ B}, (3)
θ(a) = min {β(a), ω(a)}. (4)
i.e., β(a) is the minimum reported budget required to obtain outcome a,
and ω(a) is the minimum reported valuation required to obtain outcome a.
Therefore, θ(a) serves as an upper bound on any budget-feasible individually-
rational payment for outcome a, if exists. Since f is onto, θ(a) <∞.
The next definition is a generalization of (1) to the private budget setting.
For a, a′ ∈ A, let
δ(a, a′) = inf {v(a)− v(a′) | f(v,B) = a, where v ∈ V and B ∈ B ∩ [β(a′),∞)}.
(5)
We follow the convention that the infimum over an empty set equals ∞
(observe that if β(a′) > β(a), it can be the case that f(v,B) 6= a for every v,B
with B ≥ β(a′)). Furthermore, if f is implementable then δ(a, a′) > −∞ (see
Claim 6.1).
Using δ and θ, we can now construct a finite directed graph associated with
the social choice function f .
Definition 4 (The Graph Gf, B). Let Gf, B be a complete directed graph over
the nodes M(Gf, B) = {1, 2, . . . , |A|}, i.e., the nodes of the graph correspond to
all possible outcomes. The length of a directed arc (i, k) ∈ E(Gf, B) is defined as
l(i, k) = min{δ(ai, ak), θ(ai)}.
We can now state our necessity result:
Theorem 1. If a social choice function f : V × B → A with private budgets is
implementable then the corresponding graph Gf, B contains no negative cycles.
We now consider the case where over-reporting the budget is impossible and
show the sufficiency of the condition in Theorem 1. This allows us to derive
a complete characterization of the class of implementable social choice func-
tions where over-reporting the private budget is impossible. This class is rather
general, it includes mechanisms without money, mechanisms for players with
publicly-known budgets and more. In several settings, reporting larger budgets
can be made a dominated strategy (suboptimal) by using a small randomized
modification to the payments (Bhattacharya et al.(2010)).
Theorem 2. A social choice function f : V × B → A for private budgets with
no budget over-reporting is implementable if and only if the corresponding graph
Gf, B contains no negative cycles.
Example 1 shows that the no budget over-reporting assumption is crucial to
the sufficiency in Theorem 2. Notice that Proposition 1 is not a special case of
Theorem 2, since here we restrict the values to be nonnegative.
We now consider the general setting of private budgets (assuming players can
report any budget limit) and provide a sufficient condition for implementability,
that differs from the necessary condition in Theorem 1. Our sufficient condition
for implementability requires a subtle but crucial change in (5). For a, a′ ∈ A,
we define
δ̂(a, a′) = inf {v(a)− v(a′) | f(v,B) = a, where v ∈ V and B ∈ B}. (6)
Clearly, δ̂(a, a′) ≤ δ(a, a′). Additionally, if the budget is publicly known or if
β(a′) ≤ β(a) then δ̂(a, a′) = δ(a, a′).
Definition 5 (The Graph Ĝf, B). Let Ĝf, B be a complete directed graph over
the nodes M(Gf, B) = {1, 2, . . . , |A|}, i.e., the nodes of the graph correspond to
all possible outcomes. The length of a directed arc (i, k) ∈ E(Gf, B) is defined as
l(i, k) = min{δ̂(ai, ak), θ(ai)}.
If the graph Ĝf, B contains no negative cycles then so does Gf, B, but not
vice versa.
We can now state our sufficiency results for private budgets (assuming players
can report any budget limit).
Proposition 2. Let f : V × B → A be a social choice function with private
budgets. If the corresponding graph Ĝf, B contains no negative cycles then f :
V × B → A is implementable.
Example 2 shows an implementable social choice function whose correspond-
ing graph Ĝf, B contains a negative cycle. However, if Ĝf, B = Gf, B, then the
condition in Proposition 2 is also necessary.
Theorem 3. Let f : V×B → A be a social choice function with private budgets.
If δ̂(a, a′) = δ(a, a′) for every a, a′ ∈ A then f : V × B → A is implementable if
and only if the corresponding graph Gf, B contains no negative cycles.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 1 and Proposition 2 (notice that Theorem 2 is
of no use here, since players can over-report their budget limits). ⊓⊔
4 Revenue Equivalence with Budgets
The celebrated revenue equivalence principle says that any two payment function
implementing the same social choice function differ by a constant, and thus the
payment function is uniquely defined up to an additive constant. The uniqueness
for budget constraints players is slightly more subtle.
Recall that by Lemma 1 (using the presentation assumptions in Subsec-
tion 2.2) if f(v,B) = f(v′, B′) = a for some a ∈ A we have that p(v,B) =
p(v,B′) = pa. When players have budget constraints, any two payment func-
tions implementing the same f : V × B → A might be differ by a collection
of constants. Intuitively, there might be a distinct constant for every budget
level β(a), where β(a) denotes the minimum reported budget required to obtain
outcome a ∈ A.
Definition 6 (Revenue Equivalence). An implementable social choice func-
tion f : V × B → A satisfies the revenue equivalence principle if for every two
dominant strategy implementable mechanisms (f, p) and (f, p′), we have that
β(a) = β(a′) implies that
pa − p
′
a = pa′ − p
′
a′ .
Notice that if β(a) 6= β(â) then p
â
− p′
â
need not be equal to pa − p
′
a.
4.1 Assumptions
We shall show, under several reasonable assumptions, that a necessary and suf-
ficient condition for revenue equivalence with private budget do exists. We now
state our assumptions on f .
Definition 7 (Generic Implementation at ai). Let f : V×B → A be a social
choice function, and let ai ∈ A. We say that a payment function p : V ×B → IR
generically implements f at ai if
1. (f, p) is a dominant strategy implementable mechanism.
2. Let aj ∈ A. If β(aj) = β(ai) > 0 then 0 < paj < θ(aj).
3. Let aj , ak ∈ A. If β(ak) < β(aj) = β(ai) then paj − pak 6= δ(aj , ak).
4. Let aj, ak ∈ A. If β(ak) > β(aj) = β(ai), f(v, b) = aj and v(aj) − v(ak) ≥
paj − pak then v(aj)− v(ak) > paj − pak .
If p : V ×B → IR generically implements f at ai, we say that f is generically
implementable at ai.
Intuitively, the assumption requires strict inequalities (recall Claim 6.1). No-
tice that in Definition 7, part (4) it might be the case that pak > β(aj).
Definition 8. A social choice function f : V × B → A is generically imple-
mentable if for every ai ∈ A there exists a payment function p
i : V × B → IR
that generically implements f at ai.
4.2 Characterization
In this subsection we extend a recent characterization of revenue equivalence for
multidimensional domains by Heydenreich et al.(2009). We state our characteri-
zation result for private budgets and then briefly discuss the differences between
the proof techniques. Recall that ∆Gf, B(i, i
′) is the length of the shortest path
from node i to node i′ in the graph Gf, B.
Theorem 4 (Characterization of Revenue Equivalence). A generically
implementable social choice function f : V ×B → A for private budgets satisfies
the revenue equivalence principle if and only if in all corresponding graphs Gf, B
obtained from a combination of a player and a reported valuations and budgets
of the other players we have that ∆Gf, B(i, k) = −∆Gf, B(k, i) for all ai, ak ∈ A
with β(ai) = β(ak).
Observe that f : V × B → A is implementable, and thus the proof of Theo-
rem 4 only requires the necessary condition in Theorem 1. Therefore, Theorem 4
is applicable for private budget settings (where players can report any budget
limit) satisfying the condition in Definition 8.
Essentially, the original proof of Heydenreich et al.(2009) constructs cer-
tain payments based on the specific shortest paths of the graph. However, if
∆Gf, B(i, k) = −∆Gf, B(k, i) holds then this implies that these payments can
be negative. In our setting, negative payments are excluded by the no positive
transfer requirement. Instead, our necessity proof (Claim 6.4) requires a subtle
strongly-component argument and thus is different from theirs. Our sufficiency
proof (Claim 6.4) is based on a straight-forward adaptation of Heydenreich et al.(2009)
and on Theorem 1.
5 Examples
This section illustrates our characterization results through some examples.
Example 1. We show that the no budget over-reporting assumption is crucial to
the sufficiency in Theorem 2. Consider a single player with possible outcomes
A = {a, a′}, possible private budgets B = {10, 20}, and possible values V =
{v, v′}, where v(a) = 20, v(a′) = 10 and v′(a) = 11, v′(a′) = 0. Let f(v, 20) =
f(v′, 20) = a and f(v, 10) = f(v′, 10) = a′. If over reporting the budget is not
allowed, then the payment function pa = 10 and pa′ = 0 implements f . However,
if reporting any budget is allowed then no payment implements f . To see this,
observe that pa′ must be 0 since f(v
′, 10) = a′. Then, since f(v, 20) = a we have
10 = v(a)−v(a′) ≥ pa−pa′ , and therefore pa ≤ 10. But then if the true type of the
player is (v′, 10) it is beneficial to misreport (v′, 20). Observe that Gf, B contains
no negative cycle, since min{δ(a, a′), θ(a, a′)} = 10, min{δ(a′, a), θ(a′, a)} =
min{∞, 0} = 0.
In this example we also have that Ĝf, B contains a negative cycle (since
min{δ̂(a, a′), θ(a, a′)} = 10, min{δ̂(a′, a), θ(a′, a)} = −11) and thus Ĝf, B 6=
Gf, B.
Example 2. We show an implementable f whose corresponding graph Ĝf, B con-
tains a negative cycle (and therefore the condition in Proposition 2 is sufficient
but not necessary for implementability). Consider a single player with possible
outcomes A = {a, a′}, possible private budgets B = {1, 5}, and possible val-
ues V = {v, v′}, where v(a) = 20, v(a′) = 10 and v′(a) = 10, v′(a′) = 0. Let
f(v, 5) = f(v′, 5) = a and f(v, 1) = f(v′, 1) = a′. Clearly, the payment func-
tion pa = 5 and pa′ = 0 implements f . However, min{δ̂(a, a
′), θ(a, a′)} = 5,
min{δ̂(a′, a), θ(a′, a)} = −10, that is (a, a′) is a negative cycle in Ĝf, B. To
demonstrate Claim 6.1 notice that δ̂(a′, a) < pa′ − pa = −5 ≤ δ(a
′, a) =∞.
We next consider a broad class of social choice functions known as affine
maximizers. This class encompasses the extensively studied class of weighted
VCG mechanisms. We begin with the definition of this class.
Definition 9. A social choice function f is called an affine maximizer if for
some player weights κ1 > 0, . . . , κn > 0 and some outcome weights γa ∈ IR for
every a ∈ A, we have that:
f(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ argmax a∈A {
∑
ℓ
κℓ · vℓ(a) + γa}.
We next consider a natural mechanism without money for 0/1 valuations
(intuitively, each player can vote for all his most preferred alternatives, assuming
all are equally desired).
Claim. The mechanism without money f(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ argmax a∈A {
∑
ℓ κℓ ·
vℓ(a) + γa}, where vℓ(a) ∈ {0, 1} for every a ∈ A and ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , n} (assuming
that ties among outcomes are broken lexicographically) satisfies the condition in
Proposition 1 and therefore is dominant-strategy implementable.
As stated informally in Borgs et al.(2005) no affine maximizer is implementable
with private budgets if the players can specify their budget limits in addition
to reporting their valuations (since players can over-report their values while
under-reporting their budgets to avoid charges). We use our characterization to
address the publicly-known budget case (where players cannot misreport their
budgets).
Claim. Suppose that Vℓ = IR
|A|
+ for every player ℓ and let n ≥ 2. If at least
one player has budget < ∞, then no affine maximizer is implementable with
publicly-known budgets.
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6 Appendix: Proofs
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 is the consequence of the following taxation principle
lemma and claims.
Lemma 1 (Borgs et al.(2005)). Let (f, p) be an implementable mechanism
for private budgets. Let
A(v−ℓ, B−ℓ) = {ak ∈ A | ∃v
′
ℓ ∈ Vl and ∃B
′
ℓ ∈ Bℓ such that f((v
′
ℓ, v−ℓ), (B
′
ℓ, B−ℓ)) = ak}.
The following conditions hold:
1. For every ℓ, every v−ℓ and every B−ℓ there exist prices pak ∈ IR, for every
ak ∈ A(v−ℓ, B−ℓ), such that for all vℓ and allBℓ with f((vℓ, v−ℓ), (Bℓ, B−ℓ)) =
ak we have that p((vℓ, v−ℓ), (Bℓ, B−ℓ)) = pak ≤ Bℓ.
2. For every vℓ and every Bℓ we have that
f((vℓ, v−ℓ), (Bℓ, B−ℓ)) ∈ argmax ak∈S {vℓ(ak)− pak},
where S = {ak ∈ A(v−ℓ, B−ℓ) | pak ≤ Bℓ}
Proof. Let (v,B) = ((vℓ, v−ℓ), (Bℓ, B−ℓ)) and (v
′, B′) = ((v′ℓ, v−ℓ), (B
′
ℓ, B−ℓ)).
First, suppose that f(v,B) = f(v′, B′) but pℓ(v,B) > pℓ(v
′, B′). Then,
vℓ(f(v,B)) − pℓ(v,B) < vℓ(f(v
′, B)) − pℓ(v
′, B′), while by budget feasibility
(BF) we have pℓ(v
′, B′) < pℓ(v,B) ≤ Bℓ, contradicting incentive compatibility
(IC).
Second, suppose that f(v,B) /∈ argmax ak∈S {vℓ(ak)−pak} and let f(v
′, B′) =
ai where ai ∈ argmax ak∈S {vℓ(ak)− pak}. As before, vℓ(f(v,B)) − pℓ(v,B) <
vℓ(f(v
′, B)) − pℓ(v
′, B), where pℓ(v
′, B′) = pai ≤ Bℓ, contradicting incentive
compatibility (IC). ⊓⊔
Claim. If f : V × B → A is implementable then δ(a, a′) ≥ pa − pa′ > −∞, for
all a, a′ ∈ A.
Proof. If δ(a, a′) =∞, the claim trivially holds. Otherwise, for every sufficiently
small ǫ > 0 there exist v and B ≥ β(a′), where f(v,B) = a and v(a) − v(a′) ≤
δ(a, a′) + ǫ.
By Lemma 1, no positive transfer (NPT) and (5), we have p(v,B) = pa,
where 0 ≤ pa ≤ β(a) ≤ B and 0 ≤ pa′ ≤ β(a
′) ≤ B.
Now, δ(a, a′) + ǫ ≥ v(a) − v(a′) ≥ pa − pa′ by incentive compatibility (IC).
Therefore, δ(a, a′) ≥ pa − pa′ > −∞, as required. ⊓⊔
Claim. Let C be a finite cycle in the graph Gf,B. If f : V × B → A is imple-
mentable and l(i, k) = δ(ai, ak) for every arc (i, k) ∈ C then C is a nonnegative
cycle.
Proof. We prove the claim by contradiction. Suppose there exists a finite nega-
tive cycle C in the graphGf,B such that l(i, k) = δ(ai, ak) for every arc (i, k) ∈ C.
We can assume without loss of generality that C is a simple cycle (with no re-
peated nodes). Otherwise, we can split it into two cycles, where one of them
must clearly be negative. The process repeats until we are left with a negative
simple cycle.
Without loss of generality (by renaming outcomes if necessary), we assume
that C = (1, 2, . . . , k), where k ≤ |A| . In particular, l(1, 2)+ l(2, 3)+ · · ·+ l(k−
1, k) + l(k, 1) = δ(a1, a2) + · · ·+ δ(ak−1, ak) + δ(ak, a1) < 0.
By Claim 6.1, δ(ai, ai+1) ≥ pai − pai+1 . Adding these inequalities together
leads to
δ(a1, a2)+δ(a2, a3)+· · ·+δ(ak−1, ak)+δ(ak, a1) ≥ pa1−pa2+pa2−pa3+· · ·−pa1 = 0.
But this contradicts the assumption that C is a negative cycle. ⊓⊔
Claim. Let C be a finite cycle in the graph Gf,B. If f : V × B → A is imple-
mentable and l(i, k) = θ(ai) for some arc (i, k) ∈ C then C is a nonnegative
cycle.
Proof. Suppose the claim is false. Let C be a negative cycle in the graph Gf,B
and let I+ = {(i, k) ∈ C | l(i, k) = θ(ai)}. By Claim 6.1, the set I
+ is nonempty.
We can assume that C is a simple cycle (by Claim 6.1 and its proof). Without
loss of generality (by renaming outcomes if necessary), we can further assume
that C = (1, 2, . . . ,m). Therefore, l(1, 2)+ l(2, 3)+ · · ·+ l(m−1,m)+ l(m, 1)< 0.
Now, since l(e) ≥ 0, for every arc e ∈ I+, there must exist i < k < m such
that l(i, i+ 1) + l(i+ 1, i+ 2) + · · ·+ l(k, k + 1) < 0, where (k, k + 1) ∈ I+ and
(i, i+1), (i+1, i+2), . . . , (k−1, k) /∈ I+. In particular, l(i, i+1)+· · ·+l(k, k+1) =
δ(ai, ai+1) + · · ·+ δ(ak−1, ak) + θ(ak) < 0.
By Claim 6.1, 0 > δ(ai, ai+1) + · · ·+ δ(ak−1, ak) + θ(ak) ≥ pai − pak + θ(ak).
This implies that pak > pai + θ(ak). By no positive transfer (NPT), we have
pai ≥ 0 and therefore pak > θ(ak). Consider two cases:
Case 1. Assume first that θ(ak) = β(ak). By definition, there exist v,B and
a small enough ǫ ≥ 0 such that f(v,B) = ak, where B = β(ak) + ǫ. Therefore,
pak > β(ak) + ǫ , contradicting budget feasibility (BF).
Case 2. Next assume that θ(ak) = ω(ak). By definition, there exist v,B
and a small enough ǫ ≥ 0 such that f(v,B) = ak, where v(ak) = ω(ak) + ǫ.
Therefore, pak > ω(ak) + ǫ, contradicting individual rationality (IR). ⊓⊔
6.2 Proof of Theorem 2
The first direction is by Theorem 1. The other direction follows from the next
two claims. We start by defining one more graph.
Definition 10 (The Graph Hf,B). Let M(Hf,B) = {0, 1, 2, . . . , |A|} be the
node set of the graph, where 0 is a special node, and {1, 2, . . . , |A|} correspond
to all possible outcomes. Let E(Hf,B) = E0 ∪ E1 ∪ E2 be the directed arc set of
the graph, where
E0 = {(i, k) | i, k > 0 and δ(ai, ak) <∞},
E1 = {(0, k) | k > 0},
E2 = {(i, 0) | i > 0}.
Finally, the length of a directed arc (i, k) ∈ E(Hf,B) is defined as follows:
lH(i, k) =


δ(ai, ak) if (i, k) ∈ E0
0 if (i, k) ∈ E1
θ(ai) if (i, k) ∈ E2.
Claim. If Gf,B contains no finite negative cycles then Hf,B contains no finite
negative cycles.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a finite negative cycle C in
Hf,B. Since all arcs in E(Hf,B) have length < ∞, it suffices to show that there
exists a finite cycle C′ inGf,B with a smaller length. First assume that e ∈ E0∩C.
Add e to C′, and notice that l(e) ≤ lH(e). Next assume that e = (i, 0) ∈ E2 ∩C
for some i > 0. Clearly, the consecutive arc in C must have the form e′ = (0, k) ∈
E1 for some k > 0. Add (i, k) to C
′, and notice that l(i, k) ≤ lH(i, 0) + lH(0, k).
⊓⊔
Claim. If Hf,B contains no finite negative cycles then f : V ×B → A for private
budgets with no budget over-reporting is implementable.
Proof. Consider the payment pai = ∆Hf,B (i, 0), where ∆Hf,B (i, 0) denotes the
length of the shortest path from node i > 0 to node 0 in the graph Hf,B.
Since Hf,B contains no negative cycles, we have that ∆Hf,B (i, 0) > −∞. In
addition, ∆Hf,B (i, 0) ≤ lH(i, 0) = θ(ai) <∞, since ai can be obtained for some
report of the player (recall our assumption that f is onto). This shows that the
payment satisfies individual rationality (IR) and budget feasibility (BF). To show
no positive transfer (NPT), recall that lH(0, i) = 0 and so pai = ∆Hf,B (i, 0) =
lH(0, i) +∆Hf,B (i, 0) ≥ 0, since all cycles have nonnegative length.
To show incentive compatibility (IC), assume for the purpose of contradiction
that the player can benefit from reporting v′, B′ instead of its true value v
and true budget B. Specifically, f(v,B) = ai and f(v
′, B′) = ak, but v(ai) −
∆Hf,B (i, 0) < v(ak) − ∆Hf,B (k, 0). By budget feasibility at (v,B) and (v
′, B′),
we have ∆Hf,B (i, 0) ≤ β(ai) ≤ B and ∆Hf,B (k, 0) ≤ β(ak) ≤ B
′. Importantly,
since the player cannot over-report its private budget we have β(ak) ≤ B
′ ≤ B,
and therefore δ(ai, ak) ≤ v(ai)− v(ak) <∞.
Now, lH(i, k) + ∆Hf,B (k, 0) = δ(ai, ak) + ∆Hf,B (k, 0) ≤ v(ai) − v(ak) +
∆Hf,B (k, 0) < ∆Hf,B (i, 0). Notice that lH(i, k)+∆Hf,B (k, 0) represents a length
of a path from node i to node 0 through node k in the graph Hf,B. By the above,
lH(i, k)+∆Hf,B (k, 0) is strictly smaller than ∆Hf,B (i, 0), the length of the short-
est path from node i to 0, a contradiction to the minimality of ∆Hf,B (i, 0). ⊓⊔
6.3 Proof of Proposition 2
We start by defining a related graph:
Definition 11 (The graph Ĥf, B). Let the node set of the graph beM(Ĥf, B) =
{0, 1, 2, . . . , |A|}. Let the directed arc set of the graph be E(Ĥf, B) = E0∪E1∪E2,
where
E0 = {(i, k) | i, k > 0 and δ̂(ai, ak) ≤ θ(ai)},
E1 = {(0, k) | k > 0},
E2 = {(i, 0) | i > 0}.
Finally, the length of the directed arc (i, k) is defined as follows:
l(i, k) =


δ̂(ai, ak) if (i, k) ∈ E0
0 if (i, k) ∈ E1
θ(ai) if (i, k) ∈ E2.
Claim. If Ĝf,B contains no finite negative cycles then Ĥf,B contains no finite
negative cycles.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Claim 6.2. ⊓⊔
Claim. If Ĥf,B contains no finite negative cycles then f : V ×B → A for private
budgets is implementable.
Proof. Consider the payment pai = ∆Ĥf, B
(i, 0), where ∆
Ĥf, B
(i, 0) denotes the
length of the shortest path from node i > 0 to node 0 in the directed graph
Ĥf, B.
The first part of the proof is similar to the proof of Claim 6.2. In particular,
it shows that ∆
Ĥf, B
(i, 0) satisfies BA, IR and NPT.
It remains to show the incentive compatibility (IC). Suppose to the contrary
that there exist v, v′, B,B′ such that f(v,B) = ai, f(v
′, B′) = ak and v(ai) −
∆
Ĥf, B
(i, 0) < v(ak)−∆Ĥf, B
(k, 0), where ∆
Ĥf, B
(k, 0) ≤ B.
Now, if (i, k) ∈ E(Ĥf, B), then by rearranging we have that
l(i, k)+∆
Ĥf, B
(k, 0) = δ̂(ai, ak)+∆Ĥf, B
(k, 0) ≤ v(ai)−v(ak)+∆(k, 0) < ∆Ĥf, B
(i, 0).
The left-hand side represents a length of a direct path from i to 0 (through k)
which is strictly smaller than ∆
Ĥf, B
(i, 0), the length of the shortest path from
i to 0, a contradiction to the minimality of ∆
Ĥf, B
(i, 0).
Otherwise, (i, k) /∈ E(Ĥf, B), and thus δ̂(ai, ak) > θ(ai). By BA and IR we
have
vi(ai)−vi(ak)+∆Ĥf, B
(k, 0) < ∆
Ĥf, B
(i, 0) ≤ θ(ai) < δ̂(ai, ak) ≤ vi(ai)−vi(ak).
By rearranging we have that ∆
Ĥf, B
(k, 0) < 0, a contradiction to NPT. ⊓⊔
6.4 Proof of Theorem 4
The proof is the consequence of the following claims.
Claim. Let f : V × B → A be a generically implementable social choice func-
tion for private budgets. If f satisfies the revenue equivalence principle then
∆Gf, B(i, k) = −∆Gf, B(k, i) for all ai, ak ∈ A with β(ai) = β(ak).
Proof. By Theorem 1, the graph Gf, B contains no negative length cycles, and
therefore ∆Gf, B(i, k) + ∆Gf, B(k, i) ≥ 0 for all ai, ak ∈ A. If β(ai) = β(ak) =
0, then θ(ai) = θ(ak) = 0 (since the valuation is nonnegative) and therefore
l(i, k) ≤ 0, and l(k, i) ≤ 0. Observe that none of these arcs can be negative (by
Theorem 1), and therefore ∆Gf, B(i, k) + ∆Gf, B (k, i) = l(i, k) + l(k, i) = 0, as
required.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that β(ai) = β(ak) > 0 and ∆Gf, B(i, k) +
∆Gf, B(k, i) > 0 for some ai, ak ∈ A. Let p be a payment function that generically
implements f at ai. We now construct a corresponding directed graph
−→
G defined
as follows. The set of nodes is {j | β(aj) = β(ai), aj ∈ A}. For every pair of
nodes j, j′, there is an arc (j, j′) in
−→
G if and only if p(aj) − p(aj′) = δ(aj , aj′ ).
We next look at the strongly connected components of
−→
G .
We first claim that i and k belong to distinct strongly connected components
of
−→
G . Suppose not. There is thus a path P from i to k, and a path Q from k to i in
−→
G . Clearly, P and Q are also paths in Gf, B (not necessarily the shortest paths),
and thus ∆Gf, B (i, k) ≤ l(P ), and ∆Gf, B(k, i) ≤ l(Q) (where l(P ), l(Q) denote
the length of the paths P,Q in the graph Gf, B, respectively). In particular,
0 < l(P ) + l(Q).
Now, for every arc (j, j′) ∈
−→
G we have p(aj)− p(aj′) = δ(aj , aj′). Summing
these equalities along the paths gives us 0 = Σ (j, j′)∈P δ(aj , aj′)+Σ (j, j′)∈Q δ(aj , aj′).
But since δ(aj , aj′) ≥ min{δ(aj, aj′ ), θ(aj)} = l(j, j
′), we obtain 0 = Σ (j, j′)∈P δ(aj , aj′)+
Σ (j, j′)∈Q δ(aj , aj′) ≥ l(P ) + l(Q), a contradiction. We conclude that the graph
−→
G has at least 2 strongly connected components.
Let K be a strongly connected component of
−→
G with no arcs outgoing
from a node in K to a node in some other strongly connected component
K ′ of
−→
G . It is easy to check that every directed graph has at least one such
component (e.g., since the component graph
−→
G
SCC
of
−→
G is a directed acyclic
graph Cormen et al.(2009)Chapter 22), so that K is well defined. Based on K
and p we define the following payment function:
p′(a) =
{
p(a) + ǫ if a ∈ K
p(a) otherwise.
Recall that p generically implements f at ai and so the payment function
p′ satisfies IR, BF and NPT, for some small enough ǫ > 0 (by Definition 7,
part (2)).
We now show that p′ satisfies incentive compatibility (IC). Let f(v,B) = a
and f(v′, B′) = a′. It suffices to show that v(a)− p′(a) ≥ v(a′)− p′(a′) for every
a ∈ K and every a′ ∈ A with p′(a′) ≤ B. Equivalently, we need to show that
v(a)− v(a′) ≥ p′(a)− p′(a′) for every a ∈ K and every a′ ∈ A with p′(a′) ≤ B.3
We begin with the case in which β(a′) > β(a). Since p generically implements
f at ai, then for some small enough ǫ > 0, we have that p
′(a)− p′(a′) < v(a)−
v(a′) for every a′ with β(a′) > β(a) (by Definition 7, part (4)).
Otherwise, β(a′) ≤ β(a). By (5), δ(a, a′) ≤ v(a) − v(a′), and thus it suffices
to show in all the remaining cases that p′(a)− p′(a′) ≤ δ(a, a′) for every a′ ∈ A.
Now, if β(a′) < β(a) = β(ai), then by Claim 6.1 and Definition 7, part (3),
we have that p(a) − p(a′) < δ(a, a′). Therefore, for some small enough ǫ > 0,
p′(a)− p′(a′) < δ(a, a′), as required.
For the remaining case β(a′) = β(a), there are two subcases to consider,
according to whether a′ ∈ K or not. In the first subcase p′(a) = p(a) + ǫ and
p′(a′) = p(a′) + ǫ. By Claim 6.1, p(a) − p(a′) ≤ δ(a, a′), and therefore p′(a) −
p′(a′) = p(a)− p(a′) ≤ δ(a, a′), as required.
In the other subcase, a′ /∈ K. By Claim 6.1 and the fact that K has no
outgoing arc in
−→
G , we have p(a)− p(a′) < δ(a, a′), and thus for a small enough
ǫ > 0, p′(a)− p′(a′) < δ(a, a′), as required.
Finally, since
−→
G has at least 2 strongly connected components there exist
a ∈ K and a′ /∈ K such that β(a) = β(a′). However, ǫ = p′(a) − p(a) 6=
p′(a′) − p(a′) = 0, contradicting the assumption that the revenue equivalence
principle is satisfied. ⊓⊔
Claim. Let f : V × B → A be an implementable social choice function for
private budgets with no budget over-reporting. If ∆Gf, B(i, k) = −∆Gf, B(k, i)
for all ai, ak ∈ A with β(ai) = β(ak) then f : V × B → A satisfies the revenue
equivalence principle.
Proof. Let p, p′ be payments such that the mechanisms (f, p) and (f, p′) are
implementable with private budgets. Suppose ∆Gf, B(i, k) = −∆Gf, B(k, i) for
all ai, ak ∈ A with β(ai) = β(ak). By Theorem 1 the graph Gf, B contains no
negative length cycles, and therefore all shortest paths in this graph are finite.
Let P be a shortest path from node i to node k in Gf, B, and let e = (j, j + 1)
be some arc in P .
By Claim 6.1, paj − paj+1 ≤ δ(aj , aj+1). Now, paj ≤ θ(aj) (by IR and
BF) and paj+1 ≥ 0 (by NPT) and so paj − paj+1 ≤ θ(aj), as well. Thus
paj−paj+1 ≤ min{δ(aj , aj+1), θ(aj)} = l(j, j+1). Summing over all arcs in P we
have pai − pak ≤ l(P ) = ∆Gf, B(i, k). Similarly, pak − pai ≤ ∆Gf, B(k, i). There-
fore, −∆Gf, B(k, i) ≤ pai−pak ≤ ∆Gf, B(i, k). Since, −∆Gf, B(k, i) = ∆Gf, B(i, k)
we have that pai − pak = ∆Gf, B(i, k). By the same argument we have that
p′ai − p
′
ak
= ∆Gf, B(i, k). Therefore, pai − pak = p
′
ai
− p′ak for ai, ak ∈ A with
β(ai) = β(ak), and thus f satisfies the revenue equivalence principle. ⊓⊔
3 Clearly if a′ /∈ K, p(a′) = p′(a′) and therefore p(a′) ≤ B if and only if p′(a′) ≤ B.
Otherwise, p(a′) + ǫ = p′(a′), so that for a small enough ǫ > 0, p′(a′) < θ(a′) ≤
β(a′) = β(a) ≤ B (by Definition 7, part (2)), thus p(a′) ≤ B if and only if p′(a′) ≤ B.
6.5 Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Claim 5: Without loss of generality we can assume that there are
only two possible outcomes: A = {a, b}. Let w(a) = (
∑
ℓ 6=ℓ′ κℓ · vℓ(a)) + γa and
w(b) = (
∑
ℓ 6=ℓ′ κℓ · vℓ(b)) + γb.
If w(a) = w(b), then ∆ℓ′(a, b, v−ℓ′) = 0, ∆ℓ′(b, a, v−ℓ′) = 1.
If w(a) + 1 = w(b), then ∆ℓ′(a, b, v−ℓ′) = 1, ∆ℓ′(b, a, v−ℓ′) = 0.
Finally, if w(a) ≥ w(b) + 1, then ∆ℓ′(a, b, v−ℓ′) = −∞. Note that this is not
a violation of the the condition in Proposition 1 since f is not onto in this case.
The case where w(a) + 1 < w(b) is similar. ⊓⊔
Proof of Claim 5: Suppose not. Fix f(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ argmax a′∈A {
∑
ℓ κℓ ·
vℓ(a
′) + γa′}, such that κ1 > 0, . . . , κn > 0 and γa′ ∈ IR in an arbitrary manner.
Without loss of generality (by renaming players and outcomes if necessary), we
assume that B1 < ∞ and that γa ≥ γb, where a, b ∈ A. We first prove for the
case of two players. Consider the following valuations:
v1(x) =
{
B1 + 1 if x = a
0 otherwise.
Additionally,
v2(x) =


κ1/κ2 · (B1 + 1 + L) if x = a
κ1/κ2 · (2(B1 + 1) + L) + (γa − γb)/κ2 if x = b
0 otherwise.
Note that for sufficiently large L > 0 and every c ∈ A we have
γa +
∑
i
κivi(a) = γb +
∑
i
κivi(b) ≥ γc +
∑
i
κivi(c).
Now, fix v1, v2. If player 1 increases v1(b) by ǫ > 0 then b will be chosen, and
therefore: δ1(b, a) ≤ v1(b)−v1(a) = −(B1+1). Additionally, if player 1 increases
v1(a) by ǫ > 0 then a will be chosen and therefore θ1(a) = min {B1, inf {v
′
1(a) | v
′
1 ∈
V1 such that f(v
′
1, v2) = a}} = min {B1, B1 + 1} = B1.
Now, 0 > δ1(b, a)+θ1(a) ≥ l(b, a)+ l(a, b) and therefore the graph Gf,B has a
negative cycle. By Theorem 2, f is not implementable, a contradiction. To prove
the theorem for n > 2 players , we can add n − 2 players with zero valuations
and arbitrary public budgets. ⊓⊔
